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T HE status, rights and obligations of seamen in the American Merchant
Marine are governed by elaborate statutory regulations' adopted by
Congress pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate commerce? and
"to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas";I
they are enforced by the federal courts pursuant to the jurisdiction vested
in them by the constitution over "all cases of admiralty and maritime ju-
risdiction."4 These regulations, to which seamen become subject upon
the signing of articles of shipping,' cover a variety of details from the
inception of the voyage to its termination and contain certain minimum
requirements as to working conditions.
Thus, while at sea, the crew must be divided into at least two watches
on deck and three watches below,' in order to reduce the amount of
,]Member of the New York Bar. This article was prepared at the instance of the Inter-
national Juridical Association, and the assistance of Joseph Kovner, editor of the Monthly
Bulletin of the association, is gratefully acknowledged. Appreciation is also expressed for the
-valuable suggestions of Adele I. Springer, formerly counsel to the Morro Castle Safety at
Sea Association and Assistant Counsel to the Sub-Committee of the United States Senate
Commerce Committee Investigating the Morro Castle, Mohawk and other Sea Disasters.
1. 38 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 541-713 (1926). The present provisions for
the protection of seamen were derived in large part from the La Follette, or Seamen's Act,
of 1915. All seamen shipped in the United States on American vessels are entitled to the
protection of these regulations, regardless of nationality. 17 STAT. 277 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A.
§ 713 (1926); The Laura M. Lunt, 170 Fed. 204 (E. D. La. 1909); cf. In re Ross, 140 U.
S. 453, 455 (1891). Certain of the regulations also apply to foreign seamen on foreign
vessels while in American harbors who invoke the jurisdiction of our admiralty courts.
Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348 (1920).
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, clause 3.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, clause 10.
4. U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2. Although this provision is found in a section relating
solely to the judiciary, the court has found in it a source of Congressional power. Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 39 (1932) and cases there cited.
5. These articles are standard in a form prescribed by statute [17 STAT. 264, 265, 277
(1872); 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 564, 565, 713 (1926)] and may be signed before government
agefits known as shipping commissioners. 17 STAT. 262 (1872), 24 STAT. 80 (1886), 46
U. S. C. A. §§ 545-563 (1926). The purpose of these statutory requirements is simply to
prevent shipping seamen against their will, and assigning them to different work than prom-
ised, and to insure the payment of the wages agreed upon. It does not prevent shipov, ners
from otherwise controlling the hiring of men. Street v. Shipowner's Association, 299 Fed.
9 (C. C. A. 10th, 1924) cert. den. 266 U. S. 611 (1924).
A seaman, as a member of the crew, is probably entitled, as such, to the benefits of the
statutory regulations, even though no articles of shipping are signed. 17 STAr. 277 (1872),
46 U. S. C. A. § 713 (1926); cf. Jameson v. The Regulus, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7,198, p. 336 (D.
Pa. 180D); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 424-5 (1902). A seaman shipped Vithout
such articles is entitled to the highest rate of wages paid at the port from which he is
shipped. 1 STAT. 131 (1790), 46 U. S. C. A. § 575 (1926).
6. 38 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. § 673 (1926). Several bills are now pending,
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work required of each sailor at night.' Seamen cannot be required to,
work alternately on deck and in the fireroom.8 When the ship is in a
safe harbor, the men cannot be required to do any "unnecessary" work
on Sundays or holidays or to work more than nine hours a day on oilier
days.9 A violation of any of these provisions entitles the seamen to
their discharge together with payment of all wages earned.10 In addi-
tion, the regulations specify in detail the food,11 medicine,' 2 heat,10
clothing 4 and living quarters " to which seamen are entitled during the
course of a voyage.'
The enforcement of these regulations, together with all regulations
for the promotion of safety at sea,' 7 is vested primarily in local steam-
ship inspectors'" appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.' 9 These
e.g. H. R. 6041, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935), under which the requirement of three watcher
would be extended to the deck and the crew would be given at least six hours off duty In
their twelve hours prior to sailing.
7. Cf. O'Hara v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 269 U. S. 364, 367 (1926).
8. 38 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U. S. C. A. § 673 (1926).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid; O'Hara v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 269 U. S. 364 (1926).
11. 17 STAT. 277 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 713 (1926).
12. 17 STAT. 270 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 666 (1926).
13. 17 STAT. 270 (1872), 23 STAT. 56 (1884), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 669, 670 (1926).
14. 17 STAT. 270 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 669 (1926).
15. 29 STAT. 688 (1897), 46 U. S. C. A. § 80 (1926). The space reserved for living
quarters was not less than 120 cubic feet and 16 square feet, as provided for by statute
enacted in 1897; and except for an amendment contained in the LaFollette Act, 38 STAT.
1164 (1916), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 541-713 (1926), it has not been changed since 1897, despite-
the advent of the modern steamship. Consequently living quarters are totally inadequate,
Not only has the original statute not been made to conform to modern conditions, but a
measure sponsored by the Bureau of Navigation and Steamship Inspection which is now
pending proposes to apply the present inadequate requirements to vessels under 100 tons
now exempt. H. R. 6044, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935).
16. Pending ship subsidy bills incorporate provisions for three watches on deck, con-
tinuous discharge books, and fixing of minimum manning and wage scales. SEN. 3500, 3501,
and 4110, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936). The first two place the fixing of manning and
wage scales in the Department of Commerce; the third in the Department of Labor.
17. The department immediately in charge is the Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat
Inspection of the Department of Commerce. 23 STAT. 118, 119 (1884), 16 STAT. 440 (1871),
46 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-5, 361-440 (1926). See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Navigation
and Steamboat Inspection, LAws GovERNmG STEAIMBOAT IN sPE oN, Nov. 16, 1933. The
general rules and regulations issued cover details of construction. See Fwy-scoND SuLr.-
MENT TO Gqm-A RULES AND RFuLAnoNs, Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection,
June, 1935. Pending ship subsidy bills incorporate further regulations for safety at sea.
See note 16, supra. S. 3500 leaves more to administrative discretion than does S. 4110,
18. 16 STAT. 443, 448 (1871), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 391, 435 (1926). There are two local
inspectors for each of the collection districts enumerated in the statute, one known as the
inspector of hulls, and the other, the inspector of boilers. 16 STAT. 457 (1871), 46 U. S, C. A.
§ 382 (1926).
19. 10 STAT. 443 (1871), 46 U. S. C. A. § 384 (1926).
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inspectors are under the control of a supervising inspector who is ap-
pointed by the President, with the approval of the Senate, and to whom
the local inspectors report.20 The statute merely requires that inspec-
tion of each steam vessel shall be made at least once a year; more fre-
quent inspections may be made in the discretion of the local inspectors.2"
If the inspectors find any violation of the statutory regulations, they
may revoke the certificate of inspection required of every steam vessel
and refuse to issue a new certificate until the regulations are complied
with.22 In addition, violation of certain of the statutory regulations may
lead to penalties and forfeitures which are enforced through the De-
partment of Commerce by means of the inspections.2 The system of in-
spection thus established is the only administrative method by which
the statutory regulations relating to safety at sea are enforced.
The woeful inadequacy of this system of inspection and the conse-
quent failure to enforce observance of the statutory regulations recently
aroused widespread public attention in connection with the Morro Castle
disaster on September 8, 1934. The investigations following this and
other disasters, such as in the case of the Lexington, the Mohawk, and
the Havana, disclosed, among other things, evidence of the superficiality
of the inspections, the insufficiency of the personnel conducting the in-
spections, the under-payment of inspectors, and in some cases the undue
influence exerted over inspections by ship-owners. -4
20. 16 STAT. 445, 448, 449, 457 (1871), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 373, 376, 378, 414 (1926).
21. 16 STAT. 443 (1871), 46 U. S. C. A. § 391 (1926).
22. Ibid. The decision of the local inspector may be appealed to the superior inspector
who may review the decision of the local inspector of his own accord. 40 STAr. 603 (1918),
46 U. S. C. A. § 432 (1926). An appeal lies from the supervising inspector's decision to the
Supervising Inspector General, whose decision, when approved by the Secretary of Com-
merce, is final. 40 STAT. 602 (1918), 46 U. S. C. A. § 431 (1926).
23. 16 STAT. 448 (1871), 46 U. S. C. A. § 436 (1926).
24. See Morro Castle and Mohzawk Report, SnN. REP. No. 776, 74th Cong., 1st SCES.,
Ser. No. 9884 (1935); Report on the Morro Castle of Dickerson Hoover, Bureau of Navi-
gation and Steamboat Inspection to the Secretary of Commerce (1935); Hearings before the
Department of Commerce, June 17, 20, and 21, 1935, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (Alleged Irregu-
larities in the Department of Commerce) ; Hearings before Committee on Merchani Marine and
Fisheries on H. R. 6189, 6202, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) (Extension of Steamboat Inspec-
tion Laws); Hearings before Committee on Commerce on Sen. 3500, 4110, 4111, 74th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1936) (Merchant Marine Act); Hearings before Committee on Merchant Marire
and Fisheries on H. R. 7040, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) (Safety of Life and Property at
Sea). Progress Reports, National Committee on Safety at Sea to Hon. A. Harry Moore,
chairman of the National Accident Prevention Conference of the Department of Commerce,
April 24 and 29, 1936; Minutes of Public Hearing, National Committee for Safety at Sea,
New York, N. Y., April 28, 1936; Memorandum submitted by Joseph Curran, Chairman of
Striking Members of I. S. U. to Secretary of Commerce Daniel C. Roper, April 1936 (Read
into record of Public Hearing, supra). But these abuses are of long standing. See Hearings
before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce on S. 305, 314, 71st Cong., 2nd Sees.
(1930); SEN. Doc. No. 177, 70th Cong. 2nd Sess., Ser. No. 9000 (1929) (Report on the
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It must be apparent, however, that no matter how thorough or fre-
quent the inspection, violations of regulations with respect to working
conditions, such as division of the crew into watches, will rarely come
to the attention of the inspectors unless they are reported, and it is naive
to suppose that they will be reported. The evidence shows that com-
plaints from seamen, even if made to officials of the steamship company,
not only lead to prompt discharge but to blacklisting." In the ordinary
course of events, therefore, seamen must in large part depend upon their
bargaining power to compel compliance with laws enacted for their
benefit, and they must rely entirely upon their bargaining power to
secure decent wages as well as other working conditions not specifically
covered by statute.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the connection between work-
ing conditions and safety at sea and has pointed out that the primary
purpose of the statutory regulations is to promote safety at sea.-O0 If
safety at sea requires the maintenance of proper working conditions, and
if enforcement of existing statutes governing working conditions (and
the mobilization of any pressure to improve them) requires collective
action by the seamen, it seems clear that recognition of a right of sea-
men to organize, and their corollary right to strike, is not only necessary for
the protection of the rights of seamen, but is also a necessary step in
assuring the promotion of safety at sea. But the Department of Com-
merce has taken the position that the interests of commerce require the
maintenance of "discipline" at all costs, and that seamen therefore con-
stitute a class of workers not entitled to organize to protect their rights
under the law.
Such at least was the position of the Department of Commerce in con-
nection with the strike in March of the crew of the steamship Califor-
nia, a Panama Pacific liner operated by the International Mercantile
Marine Company.2" The crew of the California had signed on in New
Steamship Vestris by Frances A. O'Neill). See also testimony in United States v. Warms, S,
D. N. Y. Jan. 25, 1936, Criminal Docket 97-133.
25. See documents note 24 supra and especially letters in the appendix to the April 24,
1936, Progress Report of the National Committee on Safety at Sea. A bill, having for its
purpose, among other things, to "increase the efficiency in administration of the steamboat
inspection laws," which was passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate,
makes it an offense punishable by a fine of $5000 or imprisonment for one year "to coerce
any witnesses, or to induce them to testify falsely in connection with a shipping casualty."
H. R. 8599 (1936), 74th Cong. 1st Sess., § 4(i).
26. O'Hara v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 269 U. S. 364 at 367-9 (1926); MeCrea v. United
States, 294 U. S. 23, 27 (1935).
27. See N. Y. Times Mar. 15, 1936, at 1, col. 4; cf. N. Y. Times, April 8, 1936, at 1,
cal. 6; April 9, 1936, at 12, col. 2. For a history of the case, see N. Y. Times Mar. 3, 1936,
at 45, col. 1; Mar. 4, at 7, col. 7; Mar. 5, at 45, col. 1; Mar. 6, at 43, col. 7; Mar. 11, at
41, col. 1; Mar. 13, at 45, col. 1; Mar. 18, at 45, col. 1; Mar. 19, at 27, col. 5; Mar. 20,
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York for a round trip to San Francisco. While the ship was moored
to the pier in the harbor of San Pedro preparatory to returning to New'
York, the crew announced that it would not release the ship from the
pier until its demand for a parity of wages on the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts had been granted, a demand which the International Seamen's
Union was negotiating with the Company. "' The crew's demand was
made in the course of a voyage during which, it was claimed, the statu-
tory prohibitions against overtime and the alternating of seamen from
one department to another had been constantly violated.
All 374 members of the crew participated in the strike, with the
result that the ship was detained in the harbor for three days, during
which time the crew remained on board and performed all requisite
duties except to release the ship from the pier. At no time was there
violence of any sort and most of the passengers remained on board.
The crew finally returned to work through the efforts of Secretary
of Labor Perkins, who pledged, among other things, that there would
be no discrimination against the strikers as to future employment. Two
weeks later, upon the arrival of the ship in New York, the crew was
signed off, but about 60 of the men were "logged" from 2 to 6 days' pay;
some, in addition, received discharge cards28 marked "D. R.," signifying
that they had declined to report, and amounting to blacklisting. Others
were told not to return and, thereafter, were actually refused reemploy-
ment. Moreover, the International Mercantile Marine Company,/ and
subsequently the Department of Commerce, officially took the position
at 29, coL 3; Mar. 21, at 19, col. 4; Mar. 23, at 39, col. 3; Mfar. 26, at 32, col. 7; Mfar. 31,
at 45, col. 1.
The strike of rank-and-file seamen in New York City which grew out of this case
and their union have been described in a series of articles. See N. Y. Times, May 13, 1936,
at 2, col 2, 3; Mlay 14, 1936, at 19, col. 2, 3; May 15, 1936, at 4, col. 3, 4; May 16, 1936,
at 5, coL 2, 3; Mlay 17, 1936, at 29, col 2, 3.
27a. At the time the wage scale on the Atlantic coast was $S7.50 a month for deck
men and $40 for stewards as opposed to $62.50 for deck men and $50 for stewards hired
on the Pacific coast. See N. Y. Times, Afar. 3, 1936, at 45, col. 1; Mfar. 6 at 43, col. 3.
28. Discharge cards are not required by law, although they are used by shipowners
who thus seek to control the hiring of men. On the Great Lakes, for example, th(e
cards, together with company-owned hiring halls became the chief method of breaking all
attempts at unionization. See, Employment System of Lake Carriers Association, U. S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, BulL 235 (1918). Proposals to subject the issuance of com-
pulsory discharge cards to governmental regulation have resulted in bitter disagreement
between the seamen and the shipowners on whether character ratings or other notations
susceptible of providing a blacklisting system sh be placed on the cards. See Hearings
before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce Sen. 306, 314, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1930) (To Amend Certain Laws Relating to American Seamen). Such proposals have,
however, been embodied in recent ship subsidy bills, as well as in specific bills. See e. g.
74th Cong. 2nd Sees., SEN. 3500, SEN. 4110 (1936).
29. See advertisement announcing cancelled sailing of the S. S. California, N. Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1936 at 2, col. 5, 6.
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that the strike constituted mutiny for which the crew should be crim-
inally prosecuted and so recommended to the Department of Justice."
Although the Department of Justice has not yet attempted to prose-
cute,30 the threat of prosecution and the action taken by the Interna-
tional Mercantile Marine Company against the leaders of the strike
squarely present the question (1) whether a strike by seamen upon a
ship moored to a pier in a safe harbor in and of itself constitutes mutiny
and (2) whether the seamen participating in such a strike for that
reason alone forfeit or lose their wages.
A STRIKE AS MUTINY
There are two criminal statutes relating to the subject of mutiny. 1
The first 2 makes it a crime punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000
and imprisonment of not more than ten years for a member of the crew of
any American vessel (a) to usurp command of the vessel or deprive the
master of authority and command on board; (b) to resist or prevent the
master "in the free and lawful exercise of his authority and command" on
board, or (c) to transfer such authority and command to another not law-
fully entitled thereto. The second and more comprehensive statute 3
makes it a crime punishable by a fine of $1,000 and imprisonment for
five years to incite revolt or mutiny "on shipboard" and defines the
acts constituting this crime in very general terms.
Under these statutes both the crime of mutiny and the crime of incit-
ing to mutiny can take place on a vessel which is either on the high seas
"or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States." A literal interpretation of the statutes might thus
lead to the conclusion that the crime can be committed on board a vessel
moored to a pier in a safe harbor,84 which is the theory to which the
Department of Commerce has apparently lent its support. The history
and judicial construction of the statutes, however, makes such an inter-
pretation clearly unreasonable.
History of the Statutes. The original statutes relating to mutiny
30. The seamen have threatened to bring a suit for libel against the officials of the Inter-
national Mercantile Marine Company who accused them of mutiny. N. Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1936, at 45, col. 1.
31. The statute prescribing disciplinary measures for "willful disobedience," 17 STAT.
273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926), is discussed below in the text.
32. 35 STAT. 1146 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 484 (1926).
33. 35 STAT. 1146 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. § 483 (1926).
34. Because of the use of a phrase "on shipboard" throughout both statutes, it would
seem, without taking into consideration the history and judicial construction of the statutes,
that if the acts alleged to constitute mutiny or inciting mutiny do not take place on ship.
board, the crime has not been committed. Cf. In re Simpson, 119 Fed. 620, 622 (D. Me.
1901). If the strikers leave the ship, however, they may become subject to a charge of
desertion, a subject discussed below in the text.
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were designed to suppress piracy. Thus, in England, an early statute on
the subject, entitled "An Act for the more effectuall Supression of Piracy,"
provided that "any person [who] shall lay violent hands on his commander
whereby to hinder him from fighting in defense of his shipp and goods com-
mitted to his trust or that shall confine his master or make or endeavor to
make a revolt in the ship shall be ajudged deemed and taken to be a pirate
felon and robber. ' *n The death penalty was prescribed for this offenseY0
As rebellion against the captain's authority came to be dissociated
from taking over the ship for piratical purposes, the courts interpreted
the statutory prohibition against "confining" the master to include con-
structive confinement through disobedience to the master's orders im-
perilling the ship's discipline37 and it was held that the charge of "making
a revolt" could be sustained even though the object was not to further
acts of piracy but to compel the captain to redress grievances. 8 Al-
though the early statute has not been repealed, insubordination in the
British Merchant Marine is now prosecuted not as mutiny under that
statute but under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, which defines
offenses against discipline for which wages may be forfeited and, in
extreme cases, a sentence of imprisonment imposed. 0
The evolution of American statutes governing the position of seamen
parallels the development of the English law, but has not proceeded so
far toward assimilating maritime labor law into the general body of
labor law, by eliminating the picturesque but archaic severity of the old
piracy and mutiny statutes. In 1790 Congress passed a Crimes Act
which included provisions to suppress piracy. Under these provisions,
which were modelled aftdr the British statute against piracy, any sea-
man who "shall make a revolt in the ship" was to suffer death as "a pirate
and a felon"4 and it was made a crime punishable by three years' im-
prisonment or a $1,000 fine to confine the master of any ship or "en-
deavor to make a revolt in such ship. " ' The lack of definition of the
word "revolt" gave the lower courts much trouble,- but the offense was
35. 11 & 12 WrL.. III, c. 7, § S (1698-9).
36. The punishment was changed first in 1837 to transportation. 7 Wrrx -. IVr & 1
Vicr. c. 88, § 3, and then in 1857 to penal servitude, 20 & 21 Vxcr. c. 3.
37. Reg. v. Jones, 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 393 (1870). The British understand mutiny
primarily in the sense of insurrection in the royal forces, i. e. the army, navy or air forces,
a subject covered by separate statute. 37 Gao. I, c. 70 (1797) (Incitement to Mutiny
Act) and 24 & 25 Gao. V, c. 56 (1934) (Incitement to Disaffection Act).
38. Reg. v. Hastings, 1 Mood C. C. 82 (1825); Reg. v. M'Gregor, 1 Car. & K. 429
(1844).
39. 57 & 58 Vicr. c. 60, § 225 (1894). The provisions of this statute are similar to our
disciplinary statute, 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926), discus-ed below in
the text.
40. Act 1790, c. 9, § 8; 1 STAT. 113.
41. Act 1790, c. 9, § 12; 1 STAT. 115.
42. Thus, Mr. Justice Washington at frst refused to recommend to the jury conviction
1936-]
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finally defined by the United States Supreme Court as "the endeavor of
the crew of a vessel, or any one or more of them, to overthrow the legiti-
mate authority of her commander, with intent to remove him from his
command, or against his will to take possession of the vessel by assum-
ing the government and navigation of her, or by transferring their obe-
dience from the lawful commander to some other person."'4a Although
this definition was probably not intended to include all acts of mutiny,
44
it succinctly summarizes the essence of the crime4r and was reflected in
the acts passed in 183546 from which the present statutes have been
derived by reenactment in 190911 without substantial change.
Judicial Construction of the Statutes. In the light of the history of these
statutes, it seems clear that conduct punishable as mutiny must be such as
to threaten or jeopardize the master's authority and endanger his ship.48
Individual acts of disobedience or occasional unpremeditated insubordina-
tion, unaccompanied by aggression or threats of violence, obviously do not
constitute such conduct even though the acts take place on the high seas.40
Although no authority has been found upon the point, it would seem that,
upon similar principles, concerted action, such as a demand for an improve-
ment in working conditions, which recognizes the master's authority and
does not directly interfere with its exercise so as to imperil the ship, cannot
constitute mutiny. Such acts, if they are offenses, may be punished as
acts of willful disobedience through disciplinary measures by
on the charge of making a revolt "however strong the evidence" because he felt that the
statute was not sufficiently explicit as to the nature of the crime and that the judiciary
would therefore usurp a legislative function if it should attempt a definition. United States
v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,264, p. 1041 (C. C. D. Pa. 1815); United States v, Bladen,
24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,606, p. 1161 (C. C. D. Pa. 1816). But cf. United States v. Kelly,
26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,516, p. 700 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1825), following United States v. Smith,
27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,337, p. 1166 (C. C. D. Mass. 1816).
43. United States v. Kelby, 11 Wheat. 417, 419 (U. S. 1826).
44. See United States v. Haines, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,275, at p. 65 (C. C. . Mass. 1829);
cf. United States v. Huff, 13 Fed. 630, 637-8 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1882).
45. The Supreme Court's definition of mutiny was followed even after the enactment of
the 1835 statutes. United States v. Forbes, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,129, p. 1141 (E. D. Pa.
1849).
46. 4 STAT. 776 (1835), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 483, 484 (1926). Cf. United States v.
Almeida, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,433 at p. 776 (E. D. Pa. 1847).
47. 35 STAT. 1146 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 483, 484 (1926).
48. Cf. United States v. Kraft, 249 Fed. 919, 921 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918) cert. denied 247
U. S. 520 (1918), in which the court, in a case involving incitement to mutiny in the
United States military service, adopted the definition of mutiny of the Standard Dictionary
as meaning "to rise against lawful or constituted authority, particularly in the naval or
military service.'
49. See United States v. Kelly, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,516, p. 700 (C. C. D. Pa. 1816)
(mere insolent conduct, disobedience of orders or even violence, if no intention to subvert
authority of mater); United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,337, p. 1166 (C. C.
D. Mass. 1816); United States v. Almeida, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,433, p. 775 (E. D. Pa.
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the master, ° or, in extreme cases, by derating,5' forfeiture of wages,02
or discharge, 3 but they can not in any proper sense constitute the feloni-
ous conduct punishable as mutiny by imprisonment for ten years. More-
over, the crew may be justified in disobeying the captain's orders.
Thus, the crew's reasonable belief that the vessel is unseaworthy will
justify their refusal to obey the master's orders until he puts back to
port.5-4
On the other hand, if there is concerted action effectually depriving or
imminently threatening to deprive the master of authority and the ship
is thereby endangered, the crew may be convicted of mutiny even
though the ship at the time is not actually on the high seas. In Hamilton
v. United States," the merchant ship Poughkeepsie, while returning to
New York, lost three propeller blades in succession and, in response to
a wireless call for assistance, was towed for repairs to Granaway's Deep,
which is about three miles from Hamilton, Bermuda, but is considered
part of Hamilton harbor. Before the repairs had been completed,
the term for which the crew had signed up expired. The crew, unaware
of the law that seamen are not entitled to be discharged until a port
of safety is reached even though their articles of shipping have ex-
pired, if the fault does not lie with the master or the owners of the ship"0
demanded their discharge with wages due them and free transportation
to New York. The captain, supported by the American consul in
1847) (unpremeditated conduct); cf. Trent v. Gulf Pacific Lines, 42 F. (2d) 903 (S. D.
Tex. 1930) ("contumacious" conduct of cook in refusing to surrender keys to !tore-
room); Alaska S. S. Co. v. Gilbert, 236 Fed. 715 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
So. Such as putting the offender on rations or in irons under 17 STAT. 273 (1872)s 46
U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926).
S1. United States v. Savage, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,225, p. 966 (C. C. D. Mass. 1M0);
Butler v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 290 Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
52. 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926).
53. The causes for which a seaman may be discharged prior to the termination of
his contract, not being specified by statute, are based upon general maritime law. The
T. F. Oakes, 36 Fed. 442, 445 (C. C. D. Ore. 188S); The Donna Lane, 299 Fed. 9779 932
(W. D. Wash. 1924). "The causes for which a seaman may be discharged are ordinarily
such as amount to a disqualification, and show him to be an unsafe or an unfit man to have
on board the vessel." The Villa Y. Herman, 101 Fed. 132, 133 (S. D. Ala. 1900). See
Smith v. Treat, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,117 at p. 683 (D. Mle. 1845).
54. United States v. Ashton, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,470, p. 873 (C. C. D. Mfas3. 1834).
See The Moslem, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,875 at p. S96 (S. D. N. Y. 1846); Dixon v. Cyrus,
7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,930, p. 755 (D. Pa. 1789).
55. 268 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920), cert. den. 254 U. S. 645 (1920).
56. Fairchild v. The Aurelius, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,609, p. 953 (D. Mass. 1841); Shanley
v. United States, 294 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923); cf. The Belvedere, 100 Fed. 493
(N. D. Cal. 1900). In the Shanley case an increase in wages obtained as the result of a
strike in a port of distress where there was no American consul was held void as having
been obtained by duress, the court saying, however, that the result "might or might not
have been different" if there had been an American consul in the port.
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Bermuda," informed the crew that they were mistaken as to their rights,
but, despite warnings that their acts constituted mutiny, they refused
to do any work from that point on, remaining on the vessel for food and
shelter since they had no money to go ashore. Ultimately, the captain
secured another crew and confined the original crew in the hold during
the return voyage. The court held that although the crew had not
usurped command of the vessel, their action in refusing to work had
successfully deprived the master of authority and that the crew were
therefore guilty of inciting mutiny.58
The question of the effect of the ship's being in harbor was not dis-
cussed by the court or pressed in argument, the court merely stating that
the ship was in a harbor that was not closely landlocked.50 The indict-
ment, however, charged that the offense had been committed on the
high seas"0 and the master testified that the ship was not at a dock and
that Granaway's Deep, where the ship was anchored, "was in no sense
landlocked."'"
But regardless of this question, the decision can be justified upon the
ground that the seamen in effect abandoned the vessel while in distress in
a port of refuge. 2 The statute makes mutiny an offense not only on the
57. The American consul in foreign ports is virtually made arbitrator of the dlspute3
between the master and his crew, and his decision is given much weight in the courts
on the question of good faith and the reasonableness of the action taken by the par-
ties. Cf. 2 Stat. 203 (1803), 46 U. S. C. A. §'684 (1926); McCrea v. United States, 294
U. S. 23 (1935); Gold v. Matson Nay. Co., 73 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934). See
DIGEsT op CONsur. R EGULATIONS RLATING Tro VrssLs AND SEAmEx, compiled in the
Consular Bureau of the Department, of State (1921).
58. The doubts raised by the Hamilton case led Senator La Follette to sponsor, as part of
a bill covering governmental supervision of hiring and discharging (See note 28, .supra),
a provision amending the mutiny law so as expressly to exempt seamen who with or
without cause leave a vessel "moored or at anchor in a safe harbor." Hearings before Sub-
committee of Committee on Commerce, SEN. 314, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., (1930). This pro-
vision is embodied in a bill now pending, H. R. 7290, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935). On
the other hand, a bill has been introduced, H. R. 8457, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess, (1936),
which under the guise of regulating issuance of seamen's certificates would require pho-
tographing, finger printing and the taking of an oath to carry out master's orders while
on shipboard, and would set up a body under the Department of Commerce to hear
charges of breaches of discipline.
59. 268 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) at p. 17, cert. den. 254 U. S. 645 (1920).
60. Hamilton et al v. The United States of America, 268 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920),
cert. denied, 254 U. S. 645 (1920), Transcript of Record filed April 14, 1920 in the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 1816, pp. 2-3.
61. Op. cit. supra note 60, at p. 11.
62. In the Hamilton case, the seamen's erroneous belief, based upon a misconstruction
of the statute, that they were entitled to their discharge was held not to constitute a
defense to a prosecution for a felony. Yet in The Thomas Tracy, 24 F. (2d) 372 (C. C.
A. 2nd, 1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 595 (1928), the master's erroneous belief, based upon a
misconstruction of the articles of shipping, that the seamen were not entitled to their dis-
charge was held a good defense to an action by the seamen for unjustifiably withholding
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high seas but "on any other waters within the admiralty or maritime jur-
isdiction of the United States"; and the provision contemplates exactly
the type of situation presented in the Hamilton case where the ship was
stranded in a temporary port of refuge. For mutiny may imperil a ship
in a port of refuge or in a harbor, or upon an inland lake or river,
exactly as the ship would be imperilled by mutiny on the high seas. The
master is, under such circumstances, equally helpless and unable to
assure safety to the passengers and property or to bring the ship to
dock, resulting in the threat to safety which the mutiny statute was in-
tended to prevent. And the conduct of the crew would nevertheless go
unpunished in such a case if admiralty jurisdiction had not been extended
to insurrection on waters others than the high seas.
Where, however, the ship is moored to a dock in a port of safety,
as in the case of the steamship California, the master has at his com-
mand the assistance of the civil authorities and the ordinary process of
the courts. Unlawful acts can be restrained or, if committed, imme-
diately punished. There can be no justification for giving the master
arbitrary authority and denying the right of seamen to strike under such
circumstances. This was recognized in the recent case of Weisthoff v.
American-Hawaiian Steamship Company.6
In that case the crew had signed on the steamship Texan at San
Francisco for a voyage to Gulf and Atlantic ports and return. During
the voyage, watches were broken and the men required to work over-
time without pay, contrary to statutory regulations. While the vessel
was in New York moored to a dock in the harbor, the entire deck crew
and that of the engine-room prepared a list of demands which were
presented to the master. These demands did not directly refer to the
master's violations of statutory regulations but, instead, included re-
quests for immediate settlement of the strike by longshoremen and sea-
men then taking place on the West Coast; payment of the 1929 wage
scale set up by the Shipping Board; more and better food: no discrimina-
tion against any of the crew; no one to be discharged, and recognition
of the Marine Workers' Industrial Union. The demands also included
a request for a division into watches and payment for overtime, both
statutory requirements. The crew refused to work until all these de-
mands had been satisfied and refused to leave the ship until the police
were summoned and came aboard. The crew then left but their demand
for their wages was evaded by their master, who stated that he had
no money at the time to pay them. The Texan, after some delay due
to the strike, subsequently sailed with a new crew.
their wages, the court saying (at p. 374): "Errors of judgment, made honestly, such as
this should not penalize the ship."
63. 79 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935) cert. denied, 296 U. S. 619 (1936).
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A suit by the members of the striking crew to recover their wages was
met with the contention by the steamship company that under the Ham-
ilton case,0' the conduct of the crew constituted mutiny and that the
crew had therefore forfeited their wages. The court dismissed this con-
tention. It pointed out that it was impossible for the master to comply
with some of the seamen's demands, but held that regardless of this
fact, the conduct of the seamen was, at most, ill-advised and was not the
"gross misconduct" resulting in a threat to safety which the mutiny
statute was designed to punish.
Since mutiny entails a forfeiture of wages,"5 the court, by awarding the
seamen their back wages, necessarily held that the strike conducted by
the crew did not constitute mutiny. Thus, at the very least, the case
decided that a crew may strike in a port of safety, such as a port of
call, when statutory regulations have been violated, and the crew is
therefore entitled to its discharge. This principle is supported by de-
cisions that a crew cannot be compelled to board an unseaworthy ves-
sel"0 and can strike if the vessel is undermanned. 7 There is every rea-
son for the extension of the principle to entitle the crew to strike because
of non-compliance with modem statutory regulations designed to make
the vessel seaworthy, for the crew is in an effective position to observe
whether these regulations are complied with and to supplement adminis-
trative inspections by compelling such compliance through refusal other-
wise to work.
The case holds in addition that a strike is lawful even though it
does not directly arise out of, and is not directly connected with, viola-
tions of the statute, for the court conceded that the master could not
have complied with some of the strikers' demands and remarked that the
strike was caused by "labor agitators" rather than by a violation of the
64. The case was not cited by the court but was the principal case relied upon by
the steamship company. By rule of the Supreme Court, a conflict between decisiong
of the Circuit Courts of Appeals is a reason for granting certiorari. U. S. Sup. Ct. Gen,
Rule XXXVIII, 5 (b). The steamship company, in its petition for certiorari, relied heavily
on an alleged conflict between the Hamilton and Weisthoff decisions, but the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, 296 U. S. 619 (1936).
65. The Mentor, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,427, p. 15 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825).
66. Cf. United States v. Ashton and The Moslem, both supra, note 54. The statute
provides that the first or second mate or a majority of the crew may cause surveyors
to investigate the seaworthiness of the vessel if unseaworthiness is discovered before the
vessel has left the harbor, but the cost of inspection and any damages occasioned by the
delay must be borne by the crew if the complaint of the crew is found to have been
"without foundation." 1 STAT. 132 (1790), 5 STAT. 396 (1840), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 653-
659 (1926). The superficiality of such inspections is well known. Cf. The Jacob Lucken.
bach, 36 F. (2d) 381 (E. D. La. 1928).
67. Cf. O'Reilly v. Dryman, 85 L. J. K. B. (N. S.) 492, 114 L. T. 613 (1915); lartly
v. Posonby, 26 L. J. Q. B. 322 (1857).
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statutory regulations. Weisthoff v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Company thus supports the proposition that if statutory violations exist, a
strike will not constitute mutiny even though the strikers' demands are
not primarily directed to compelling the master to comply with the law.
This principle was implicit in an earlier case in which it was held that
if there has been a statutory violation entitling a member of the crew
to his discharge, he may leave the vessel and is entitled to his wages
even though he gives some reason other than the violation of the statute
for his departure."'
But the case cannot properly be confined to a situation where the
crew is entitled to its discharge because of violations of statutory
regulations. If conduct is mutinous because the master is deprived
of authority over the ship, the mere existence of circumstances entit-
ling the seamen to their discharge will not of itself constitute a
defense. This is manifest from dicta to the effect that the master's
failure to observe statutory regulations on the high seas entitles the crew
to complain to the nearest American consul,'0 renders the master or the
owners of the vessel liable to the crew7" and may subject them to crim-
inal prosecution or penalties71 but does not justify direct action by the
crew to remedy the situation through mutiny.72 Weisthoff v. American-
Hawaiian Steamship Company must therefore be taken as an unequivo-
cal affirmance of the principle that a peaceful strike by seamen upon a
vessel moored in a port of safety will not constitute the crime of mu-
tiny, where the strike, though in derogation of the master's authority,
does not carry with it the dangers to the ship resulting from "mutiny. " ra
68. El Estero, 14 F. (2d) 349, 350 (S. D. Tex. 1926); aff'd in Southern Pac. Co. v.
Hair, 24 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. Sth, 1928).
69. 17 STAT. 269 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 662 (1926) (provisions or water).
70. 17 STAT. 270 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 665 (1926) (provisions). Both the ship and
the owner of the vessel are liable. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Cor-
poraluon v. Greenwald, 16 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927).
71. 3 STAT. 513 (1819), 18 U. S. C. A. § 481 (1926); 46 U. S. C. A. § 657 (1926)
(medicines), § 669 (clothing and heat), § 670 (slop chests).
72. Cf. United States v. Reid, 210 Fed. 486, 491 (D. Del. 1913).
73. Cf. The South Portland, 111 Fed. 767, 768 (D. Wash. 1901), in which the court
said, in criticizing a master who had caused his crew to be arrested for refusing to work:
"No matter how much inconvenience and loss shipowners and merchants and travelers
may suffer by the detention of an American ship, caused by the refusal of the crew, when
the vessel is in port, to proceed on a voyage, it is unlawful to use judicial process or
force to coerce the crew2'
In The Blake, 1 W. Rob. 73 (Adm. 1839), the refusal of an intoxicated crew to hoist
anchor was held a serious offense but not sufcient to forfeit wages as mutiny, the court
saying (at pp. 87-8): "The consequence was a gross disobedience of the master's authority,
but there was no mutiny, and it is absurd to suppose that a concerted mutiny would have
been planned in the presence of a Queen's ship stationed within a few yards of the vessel.
It is also to be observed, that the occurrence took place in port, where the ship was exposed
1936]
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A STIKE AS EFFECTING A FORFEITURE OF WAGES
The general maritime law punished offenses of seamen against disci-
pline by the forfeiture, in whole or in part, of wages earned, depending
upon the nature and gravity of the offense. The theory of such for-
feitures was that, in offending against discipline, a seaman was guilty
of a breach of his articles of shipping, which pledged him to good con-
duct, and that the owner of the vessel was therefore entitled to com-
pensation. 4  As a practical matter, however, although it was
open to the owner of the vessel to prove actual damages,75 the court
came to take upon itself the role of taskmaster and to forfeit wages
more or less as a punitive or disciplinary measure." The role which the
court thus assumed has been recognized by statute,77 which expressly
vests in the court discretion to punish the offenses against discipline
therein described by forfeiture of wages or even by short terms of im-
prisonment.
Offenses for which wages could be forfeited under general maritime
law included mutiny78 and desertion,79 which were considered a total
breach of contract calling for the forfeiture of all wages earned, and
gross misconduct, such as habitual drunkenness or insubordination and
continual neglect of duty,s for which all or only a portion of wages
to no hazard, and I draw a strong line of distinction between disobedience of orders in
port, and any insubordination whatever when the vessel is on the high seas, where it
might expose to destruction the ship, cargo and the lives of all on board." (Italics added).
The Act of 1790, 1 STAT. 113 (1790), did not specify where the offense of endeavoring to
commit a revolt might take place and it was held that under this Act the offense could take
place on a vessel moored in a harbor or on a river. United States v. Hamilton, 26 Fed. Cas, No.
15,291, p. 93 (C. C. D. Mass. 1818) ; United States v. Haines, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,275, p, 62
(C. C. D. Mass. 1829). In both cases the master was taken ill and the crew refused to put to
sea with a new master. The court held that the substitution of a new master did not dis-
solve the articles of shipping and the crew's demand for a discharge was therefore Illegal.
The cases therefore have no application to strikes for a proper purpose, such as to enforce
compliance with statutory regulations. In United States v. Lynch, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,648,
p. 1033 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1843), two members of a crew were fAund guilty under the
1835 Act, 4 STAT. 776 (1935), 18 U. S. C. A. § 483, 484 (1926), of endeavoring to make a
revolt upon a vessel in a harbor 50 or 60 yards from the dock. In that case, the vessel
was not moored to a dock but on the contrary was proceeding to sea and had merely
dropped anchor to take on the pilot. In any event it is to be doubted whether any of these
cases represent the law today in view of the decision in the Weisthoff case and of the fact
that at the time they were decided, the right to organize was not recognized and strikes
were illegal. FRAzuRn m & GREENz, Tua LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) pp. 2-4.
74. CuRTIS, MERCHANT SEAZEN (1841), p. 303; The Lima, 3 Hagg. 346, 357 (Adm,
1837).
75. The Mentor, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,427, p. 15 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825).
76. See The Florence, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,881 at p. 296 (E. D. N. Y. 1866).
77. 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926).
78. The Mentor, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,427, p. 15 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825).
79. Cloutman v. Tunison, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,907, p. 1091 (C. C. D. Mass. 1833).
80. The Mentor, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,427, at pp. 17, 18 (C. C. D. Mass. 1825); The
Florence, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,881, at p. 296 (E. D. N. Y. 1866).
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could be forfeited, depending upon the circumstances. Certain of these
offenses are now defined and the penalty limited by statute,"' but since
forfeiture under general maritime law is theoretically founded upon con-
tract, it may be that wages can still be forfeited under general maritime
law, at least where the statute does not define the offense for which for-
feiture is sought."'
Thus, although there is nothing in the statute authorizing a for-
feiture because of mutiny, nevertheless, since wages could be forfeited
because of mutiny under the general maritime law, mutiny would in all
probability still constitute a good defense to an action for wages.8
Where, however, the statute defines a category of offenses broad enough
to include in its terms what had been one of the offenses at general mari-
time law for which a forfeiture could be decreed, it would seem reason-
able to suppose that the penalty prescribed by the statute would be held
exclusive.8 4
Offenses other than mutiny with which striking seamen have been
charged in an effort to withhold their wages are willful disobedience
and desertion.
Willful Disobedience. The statute provides" that "willful disobedience
to any lawful command at sea" may be punished by disciplinary measures
by the master and, "upon arrival in port, by forfeiture of not more than 4
days' pay, or, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment for not more
than one month." The statute further provides o that "continued willful
disobedience to any lawful command or continued willful neglect of
duty at sea," may be punished likewise by disciplinary measures by
the master and, upon arrival in port, by forfeiture of pay during the
period of disobedience or neglect, or, in the court's discretion, by im-
prisonment for not more than 3 months.
The distinction between mutiny, which is a felony, and willful dis-
obedience, which is at most a misdemeanor, is one of substance rather
than of degree. Conduct constituting mutiny must in some way im-
peril the master's authority so as to endanger the ship, whereas willful
disobedience is merely an infraction of discipjine, the punishment of
which in large part rests in the discretion of the master and the court.
Since willful disobedience has been made a statutory offense, statutory
81. 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926).
82. CuRTis, op. cit. supra note 74, at p. 305.
83. In Weisthoff v. The Ainerican-Hawaiian Steamship Company, supra, note 63, both
the parties and the court appear to have assumed, without argument, that proof of
the charge of mutiny would forfeit the seamen's wages.
84. Thus, habitual drunkenness might fall into the category of continued neglect of duty
under the offense of willful disobedience.
S5. 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926).
86. Ibid.
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formalities, such as entry of the acts constituting the offense in the ship's
log,87 must be complied with. The failure to make such an entry at
the time may constitute a defense to prosecution.88
The statute making willful disobedience an offense was designed pri-
marily to punish acts of misconduct of individual seamen and the ques-
tion whether all the members of a crew who participate in concerted
action, such as a strike, can be jointly prosecuted for a conspiracy
willfully to disobey and neglect their duty does not appear to have been
decided. 9 However, each member of a crew participating in such con-
certed action could doubtless be found guilty of actual willful disobedi-
ence if all the other elements of the offense were present.
But it seems clear that members of a crew participating in a strike
on board a vessel which is not on the high seas cannot be guilty
of willful disobedience under the statute, for the statute only makes
willful disobedience an offense "at sea." 0  Whether a strike at sea
renders the crew guilty of the offense must depend upon the justifi-
cation for the strike. Thus, where the vessel is found to be unsea-
worthy 9' or undermanned,92 the crew may properly compel the master
87. 17 STAT. 274 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 702 (1926).
88. "The evident purpose of the statute is to prevent prosecution for breaches of dis-
cipline on shipboard, except in those cases where the master shall deem the matter of
sufficient importance, while the circumstances are all fresh in his memory, and before there
is any temptation to make use of it as a means to some other end, to enter a charge
against the offender, together with his reply, in the official log-book. If any difficulty
arises between the crew and the master, a previous offense or dereliction, of which no entry
was made, cannot be invoked or trumped up, as a make-weight in this subsequent contro-
versy." United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,672, at p. 1276 (D. Ore. 1876).
In accord: The Sonderborg, 47 F. (2d) 723 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
618 (1931); The Ella Pierce Thurlow, 18 F. (2d) 675 (E. D. Va. 1926), aff'd with modi-
fications, sub nomine Swanson v. Torry, 25 F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928). But since
the court is by statute vested with discretion as to whether it will receive the log-book
in evidence, it has been held that the master's entry of the offense of desertion on the
articles of shipping but not in the log was a sufficient compliance with the "true spirit"
of the statute. The Sharon, 52 F. (2d) 481 (E. D. Va. 1931).
89. Although this question was raised in the Hamilton case, the court did not find It
necessary to pass upon it.
The British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 [57-58 Vicr. c. 60, § 225 (1894)] makes It a
distinct offense to "combine" with any of the crew to disobey lawful commands or to
neglect duty or to impede the navigation of the ship or the progress of the voyage.
90. "The term 'high seas' includes waters on the sea coast without the boundaries of
low-water mark.. ." In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 471 (1891). Quaere, whether striking mem-
bers of a crew on a vessel in a harbor can be found guilty of willful disobedience under
the general maritime law.
91. United States v. Ashton, and The Moslem, both supra note 54.
92. The British statute (supra note 39) does not confine the offense of willful disobedl.
ence to willful disobedience at sea. In O'Reilly v. Dryman, 85 L. J. X. B. (N. S.) 492,
(1915), the refusal of the crew to put to sea in a vessel on which there were Insufficlent
seamen to man the lifeboats was held not to constitute the offense. Cf. Hartly v. Posonby,
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to put back to port and the master's order to the contrary will not be
considered "lawful." Upon similar principles, where the crew discovers
other violations of statutory regulations, a refusal to comply with the
master's orders until such Aolations are remedied should not constitute
willful disobedience.
Desertion. Desertion, in certain European countries, was at one time a
capital offense. 3 In the United States, a deserter could originally be im-
prisoned or captured and made to serve out the full term of his contract."
Today, however, a seaman is free to leave the ship without committing a
crime,95 except that he can be punished, under the statute, by forfeiture of
all wages and all clothes and effects left on board. G
The essence of the offense of desertion is the quitting of the ship with-
out leave and without intention to return.07 It would seem dear, there-
fore, that where seamen taking part in a strike do .not quit the vessel,
their mere refusal to work does not constitute desertion.08 Moreover, if
26 L. J. Q. B. 322 (1857). In Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,930, p. 755 (D. Pa.
1789), the crew Tefused to weigh anchor until the rigging was repaired. The court held
that this action was not mutinous conduct requiring a forfeiture of wages.
93. For a history of the early statutes relating to desertion, see P. S. TAYLOa, Tim
SAILORS' Umox or r=E PAcmIc (1923) 4-7; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897),
and The City of Norwich, 279 Fed. 687 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922).
94. Act 1790, c. 29, § 7, 1 STAT. 134, subsequently enacted as R. S. §§ 4593, and 4599.
The Supreme Court held that the latter statutes were not in conflict with the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting involuntary servitude, because "from the earli-
est period the contract of the sailor has been treated as an exceptional one" involving the
surrender of personal liberty. Roberts v. Baldwin, 16 U. S. 275, 282-283 (1897). In addi-
tion, desertion was punishable by imprisonment for three months. 17 STAT. 273 (1872).
95. Section 19 of the Act of December 21, 1898, 30 STAT. 760, 46 U. S. C. A. § 701
(1926), amended R. S. § 4596 so as to eliminate compulsory imprisonment and to vect
discretion in the court to punish deserters by imprisonment for not more than one month.
The 1898 Act was interpreted as abolishing the authority to imprison a seaman for re-
fusing to perform his contract while the ship was in port. The South Portland, 111 Fed.
767 (D. Wash. 1901); see Johnston v. Mowatt, 115 Fed. 844, 845 (E. D. Pa. 1902). But
it was not until the La Follette Act of 1915 (supra note 1) that imprisonment for desertion
was finally abolished. Cf. The Italier, 257 Fed. 712, 713 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1919).
96. 17 STAT. 273 (1872), 46 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1926). The statute also punishes conduct
in the nature of, but not amounting to desertion, such as (1) absence without leave and
without sufficient cause and absence without leave at any time within 24 hours of the ves-
sel's sailing from any port, both punishable by forfeiture of not more than 2 days' pay
or sufficient to defray the expenses of hiring a substitute, and (2) quitting the ve.-el
upon her arrival in port but before she is placed in security, punishable by forfeiture of
not more than one month's pay.
97. The Italier, 257 Fed. 712, 713 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1919); The City of Norwich, 279
Fed. 687 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922).
98. In a few cases, of doubtful authority, in which seamen have been held guilty of
desertion, it does not appear whether the seamen, after refusing to work, actually left
the ship. The Elswick Tower, 241 Fed. 706 (S. D. Ga. 1917). None of the--- cares
,discuss the question whether refusal to work as such constitutes "constructive" d~ertlon.
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the shipowner compels seamen to leave because they strike, there is like-
wise no reason for finding that they have voluntarily quit the ship within
the meaning of the offense of desertion. The desertion must be volun-
tary and it has therefore been held that imprisonment on land by civil
authorities will not make the seaman a deserter.0
Even where the seamen leave the ship in the course of a strike but
make it clear that they will return if their demands are met, they cannot
properly be held guilty of desertion since that offense contemplates an
unequivocal intention permanently to abandon the ship.100 In any event
it is clear that if the seamen are entitled to their discharge by reason of
violation of statutory regulations, abandonment of the ship in the course
of a strike is not desertion. This was decided in Weisthoff v. American-
Hawaiian S. S. Co., in which the steamship company, in addition to claim-
ing that the seamep were guilty of mutiny in refusing to work and in
leaving the ship while on strike, also contended that the seamen were
guilty of desertion, a contention which the court disposed of in short
order.101
The ground of the decision is that failure by the shipowner to comply
with statutory regulations constituted a breach of the seamen's articles
of shipping. A breach of these articles may likewise occur even though
the statute does not specifically provide that it shall entitle seamen to
their discharge. Thus, under general maritime law applicable today, a
seaman will not be considered a deserter if his leaving the ship is found
justified by unsatisfactory working conditions. 02 If this principle should
But the concept and generally accepted definition of the offense would seem a clear
answer.
99. The Lizzie M. Dun, 30 Fed. 927 (E. D. N. Y. 1887); Costello v. American Steam-
ship Co., 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,263, p. 610 (E. D. Pa. 1875). Cf. The Maria, 16 Fed. Cas.
No. 9,074, p. 725 (S. D. N. Y. 1832).
100. In a few cases, seamen have been held guilty of desertion for leaving the ship
in the course of a strike. United States v. Smith, 12 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926),
cert. denied 271 U. S. 686 (1926); The M. S. Elliott, 277 Fed. 800 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921);
The Moonlight, 125 Fed. 429 (S. D. N. Y. 1903). In all these cases, however, the
seamen left unconditionally and without offering to return if their demands were complied
with; the offense was therefore complete. Moreover, in none of these cases did it appear
that there were violations of statutory regulations entitling the seamen to their dis.
charge.
101. In accord: The Mount Everest, 17 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927). If a viola-
tion of a statutory regulation exists entitling a seaman to his discharge, he will not be con-
sidered a deserter even though he leaves the ship for other reasons. El Estero, 14 F.
(2d) 349, 350 (S. D. Tex. 1926), aff'd in Southern Pac. Co. v. Hair, 24 F. (2d) 94 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1928).
102. The Heroe, 21 Fed. 525 (D. Del. 1884) (unseaworthiness); Savary v. Clements,
74 Mass. 155 (1837) semble; The Sirius, 47 Fed. 825 (N. D. Cal. 1891) (excessive load-
ing of British ship in violation of British statute). See The City of Norwich, 279 Fed.
687, at pp. 691-2 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922); The Childe Harold, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,676, p. 619
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be applied to all major safety regulations provided by statute so that
the failure of the shipowner to reme.dy such violations would entitle the
crew to leave as a body,'013 the possibility that a crew might justifiably
leave the ship before the termination of the voyage would operate as a
powerful measure for the enforcement of statutory regulations and for
the promotion of safety at sea.
CONCLUSION
None of the penalties imposed by law upon seamen for mutinous con-
duct or infractions of discipline were intended to apply to a peaceful
strike in a port of safety. The law was intended to confirm the master's
supreme authority on the high seas when the master, single-handed,
must enforce his orders, disobedience to which may lead to his over-
throw and imperil the safety of ship, passengers and cargo. No such
dangers are threatened while the ship is moored to the dock in a port of
safety. At most, the shipowner suffers a pecuniary loss through the
delayed sailing of the vessel-a loss which is a lawful incident to all strikes,
which uniformly depend for their effectiveness upon the interruption of
production.
Through the statute abolishing imprisonment as a penalty for deser-
tion, which was enacted subsequent to the mutiny statute, seamen leaving
a ship cannot be subjected to imprisonment in order to compel them to
remain at work. Surely the mere fact that seamen, in the course of a
strike, remain on board instead of leaving a ship moored in a port of
safety cannot in itself make the difference between guilt or innocence of
the crime of mutiny.
(S. D. N. Y. 1846) (unwholesome or spoiled provisions); The John L. Dimmich, 13 Fed.
Cas. No. 7355, p. 691 (D. Ale. 1858); The Karoo, 49 Fed. 651 (D. Wash. 1S92) (failure
to supply medicine); The Castilla, 1 Hagg. 59 (1822) (want of sufficient provisions).
Cf. Hartley v. Posonby, 26 L. J. Q. B. 322 (1857) (where some of the crew desert leav-
ing the ship short-handed, the remaining seamen are thereupon entitled to their dicharge
and there is therefore sufficient consideration for contract with them for increased wages)
with Shanley v. United States, 294 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). It has been held, how-
ever, that unseaworthiness does not constitute a breach of contract but merely entities
the crew to have a survey made under the statutes referred to in note 66, mspra.
103. There is ground for an argument, upon the authorities cited in note 102, supra,
that implied in every seaman's contract is an agreement by the owner of the veszel that
the vessel will comply with all safety regulations and that the failure to oberve these
regulations will therefore entitle the seamen to leave the ship. Thus in Dixon v. The
Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,930, at p. 757 (D. Pa. 1789), the court stated that a term of the
seaman's contract is that "the ship shall he furnished with all the necesary and cus-
tomary requisites for navigation, or, as the term is, shall be found seaworthy.' This
statement was recently quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Stone in a footnote to a
dictum that "unseaworthiness embraced defective appliances.' The Arizona v. Anelicb,
U. S. Sup. Ct, April 27, 1936, 3 U. S. L. W. 830.
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Most of the cases discussing the rights of seamen are antiquated by
economic developments. But it is implicit even in these cases, decided at
a time when the right to organize was denied and a strike by any class of
workers was illegal, and when seamen quitting their ship could be im-
prisoned, that the unseaworthiness of a vessel was a grievance of which
the crew might justifiably complain and which, if occasion required,
they might properly combine to remedy.
For it is the crew, not the owner of a vessel or even its passengers,
which is primarily concerned with the seaworthiness of a vessel and
which is in the best position to know whether there has been compliance
with the regulations designed to promote safety at sea. But since action
by individual members of the crew is ineffectual, collective action is
necessary. To deny the right of seamen to take collective action is to
destroy a safeguard necessary to supplement even the most vigilant ad-
ministrative enforcement of the law.
But safety at sea requires more than enforcement of safety regulations.
It depends also upon a personnel made efficient not by "discipline" but
by decent working conditions. Such conditions are most effectively
secured through the bargaining power of the seamen themselves rather
than through legislative or administrative action. It should be self-
evident that the right of seamen to organize and to strike where the ship
is not thereby imperilled is essential to enforce compliance with statutory
regulations and to secure decent working conditions, without which there
can be no safety at sea.
The law now acknowledges, and even favors the right to strike as
essential to a satisfactory adjustment of industrial conflicts within the
framework of a democratic society. Special circumstances of danger may
deny seamen that privilege when at sea or in a port of refuge. But there
can be no reason of policy, and no support in the doctrines of maritime law,
for denial to seamen when in a port of safty of a right freely recognized
in other classes of workers.? 4
104. Seamen are at present organized in the International Seamen's Union of America,
an A. F. of L. union, which is a federation of regional groups and sections of men en-
gaged in the shipping industry. It has had a long history and was torn by Internal dis-
sension, and still varies in strength and attitude, with locals in each port. See Albrecht,
The International Seamen's Union of America, Bulletin of U. S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, No. 342, Misc. Ser. (1923); P. S. TAYLOn, SAnoRs' UNION OF TUE PACIFc; N.
SPARxs, THE STRUc GLE oF T= MAR WORXERS, International Pamphlets, No. 5, 44,
ff. (1930). See also series of articles on the Seamen's Union cited note 27, supra.
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